



Archive as Thesis/Thesis as Archive 
 
‘Descending into the archives,’ ‘sifting through the archives’: both of these phrases seem to suggest 
the dust of centuries, a stratified archaeology of layers, knowledge that is catalogued, safeguarded, 
hidden, forbidden. The archive is, perhaps, a vault, an impregnable holding cell for the preservation 
of things, for the arrangement of ideas, for the protection of reputations—or is it a promise ‘of the 
future, to the future,’1 the place where new relationships emerge, where transmutation is the 
defining theme, where the play of the trace flits through the shadows? 
How does the thesis itself, in its status as a body of work, and the structural presentation of that 
work, fit into (or ‘be’) the archive? What is its ontological status? Consider the two quotes below, 
both by authors and creative practitioners much concerned with the nature of archives, archival 
structures, archontic principles:    
 
We think that with these new technologies we can record things, capture things and keep them for 
future generations…but those archives are becoming less and less permanent. I actually enjoy that 
tension…   
        (Christian Marclay, ‘Overtures’)2 
 
…the archive, as printing, writing, prosthesis, or hypomnesic technique in general is not only the place 
for stocking and for conserving an archivable content of the past which would exist in any case, such 
as, without the archive, one still believes it was or will have been. No, the technical structure of the 
archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into 
existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as it records the 
event.  
(Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever)3  
 
Through his work with the manipulation of ‘found’ objects (records, CDs, photographs, and film) and 
their afterlives, in works such as Record Without a Cover (1985), More Encores (1988), and 
Accompagnement Musical (1995), Marclay raises the question of the sound archive: its portability; 
the collation, curation, and bricolage of sound documents; and the contradiction between 
ephemeral sound itself as ‘permanent’ document. Through sound’s and the sound document’s 
inevitable decay (both live and in recorded form), he questions the permanence that the archive (in 
many instances) stands for.  
Archive Fever (1995) is Derrida’s deconstruction of the nature of recording and inscription, of forms 
and systems of documentation, of electronic communication and retrieval, mediated by an extended 
contemplation of psychoanalysis and its forms and systems of ‘writing’ and recording. In the above 
quote, Derrida alludes to the archive’s fluidity of status, inasmuch as the archive cannot be viewed 
 
1 Derrida, 1998, 18. 
2 Marclay, C., quoted in ‘Overtures’, González, J., 2005, 63.   
3 Derrida, 1998, 16-17. 
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as an unchanging vault filled with separate contents, a vault that will one day be full, replete and 
closed; rather, it is a place that itself adapts (its structure) to its new contents, as they grow (or 
diminish), a place where said contents adapt and change their structure as they are placed together 
in the archive, even a place that creates its contents—it creates the event.4 He questions the idea of 
the ‘dead,’ or nostalgic, document, instead proposing that the process of archivisation makes a new, 
living event. Thus, dead becomes live, archived becomes performative, the archive is interactive, it 
speaks to the future. We should also remember the hidden archives within ‘things’ and texts, their 
implied cultural and historical archaeologies, even when their purpose is lost (and must be 
[re]imagined) or their function is completely removed from that original purpose.  Repurposed 
sounds and objects, texts (including scores) that are now untranslatable or open to multiple 
interpretations through their (wilful?) refusal to provide any ‘rules,’ the museum exhibits (objects) 
with no discernible function—or do I mean that the museum exhibits (shows) to no purpose? What 
was that thing for? What did that mean? What are they now?  
We could pose a number of conceptual questions regarding the thesis as archive: we could think 
about its structure, its presentational format—in this case, digital texts, sound files (MP3s), artworks 
and recorded performances (MP4s), rather than physical texts and live performances. Or why not a 
room of exhibits—books, records, scores, instruments, paint—with interactive films interspersed 
with live performances, but no guidance as to what ‘path’ to follow? How is the format of the thesis 
structured by its contents and how do the contents adapt to the ‘form’ (or container) of the thesis? 
Does the thesis, in fact, ‘make’ the contents? Is the ‘event’ that Derrida speaks of—the creation of 
new objects (rather than a collation of old ones) in order to form a new archive—a thesis? Does the 
thesis archive ‘die’ as soon as it is formed, or does its interactive and transformative potential (as 
well as the accrual of new contents) give it endless life? We could contemplate the relationships the 
thesis engenders through the very act of collation and curation between its selected works: do these 
works ‘talk’ to one another; do they comment, or even interrogate? Do they become a ‘new’ work? 
The voices of the dead—how does the inclusion of pre-recorded ‘found’ materials, whether LPs, time 
loops or ‘live/dead’ radio signals, sit within the archive? It seems that the archive is open to 
deconstruction in terms of its structure, its contents, and its ontology. 
Let’s ponder some of these issues; what is at issue in this particular archive? 
1. Sounds: their recording, in other words, their status as temporal audio-documents; their 
assemblage, their reuse, i.e. all of the recorded performance projects, the performance projects 
which involve some kind of outside, recorded/electronic source, or manipulation of ‘live’ sounds 
(Marclay’s ‘dead sounds—see below); radio and distortion (electronic) effects in Pole, records in 
Four⁶ (LP version) and time loops with Ableton in Metatechnic. 
2. Structures: the effects of an electronic/digital format and the implications for memory. Archive as 
canon, archive as institution, archive as the rule of law. Derrida’s archive, as printing, writing, 
prosthesis, or hypomnesic technique, where the consignation of memory to documents, whether 
physical or digital, which Derrida sees in terms of the process of différance,5 rather than in terms of 
 
4 For example, the news media creates ‘events’ through its coverage, and the news media can itself become 
the ‘event,’ as in a ‘media circus.’ A performance has to be set up in order to be documented; certain things 
have to be done before the documentation can take place; then, during the process of documentation, 
sometimes re-takes have to made in ‘live’ shows, because the footage first captured was not suitable or the 
process of documentation had technical issues, etc., which can also lead to misunderstandings such as “can we 
do that again?” “no, you’re on air” (which occurred in two of the Cage performances, as it happens, but I left 
the ‘mistakes’ in). 
5 See also ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ in Dissemination, 1981. 
3 
 
metaphysical binary opposition: that is, the opposition between the ‘dead’ memory of hypomnesis 
and ‘living’ memory of the ‘by heart’ does not exist for Derrida. This raises questions regarding the 
format of this thesis. How do a collection of new texts and live performances—which are digitally 
stored and recorded (in a virtual archive), and which also re-use other electronic hypomnesic 
archives in the process—come together in the production of a new archive? What is the ontological 
status of this archive? Does this archive expect certain things because of its format and does that 
have implications for the reader/viewer? 
3. Objects: scores, instruments, papers, records (LPs). The materiality and fetishization of the 
everyday (or otherwise) means of performance. All of the works presented utilise ‘things’: the piano 
as dramatic percussion instrument, played by singer and pianist alike in Weiβschatten; the array of 
tools—from paint brushes to toy instruments to LPs to kitchen paraphernalia—in the five versions of 
the John Cage project (an archive within an archive); the percussion, the effects boxes, and the 
radios in Pole; and Metatechnic’s tactile employment of Ableton and de-preparation 
(deconstruction) of the prepared pianos. Can the fetishization of these objects—their cultural (and 
economic) significance—be problematised to the extent that we can wrest agency from them, 
possibly by repurposing their cultural impedimenta, or by changing their locations? Is the archive an 





 Music is a temporal, ephemeral event (and in a live context, probably a social event too), so the 
audio document immediately opens up a nice set of contradictions. The recording (in any format) 
forces the live performance (which itself was a ‘fixed’ moment drawn from an endless lexicon of 
performative possibilities) into a format where it can be replayed until it breaks and is no longer 
audible.6 The immediacy and sociability of the live event is gone, as Marclay says: ‘records are about 
dead sounds, but when I bring records into a performance and play with them, I change my role 
from a passive listener to an active player; the same is true for the audience. I give a new life to 
these dead sounds.’7 Whether or not listening is a passive activity is highly subjective and open to 
debate, but the social and performance possibilities for the audio-document—its afterlife, if you 
like—certainly open up an intriguing field of enquiry.8 A note of caution, though, for we must take 
care not to become thralls to binary oppositions: here’s what Derrida has to say about the dead and 
the living: ‘Let us guard against saying that death is opposed to life. The living being is only a species 
of what is dead, and a very rare species.’9 Perhaps it would be better to refer to Marclay’s audio 
documents as ‘undead’ sounds, as zombies,10 zombies who problematise the metaphysical spatial 
opposition of near and far and the temporal opposition of past and present? 
 
6 Which opens a new field of performance, of course. 
7 Marclay, 2014, 25. 
8 For more on this subject see: Thom Holmes, Electronic and Experimental Music. Technology, Music and 
Culture (2020) and Christoph Cox & Daniel Warner, Audio Culture, 2017. 
9 Derrida, 2014, 51. 
10 They could also be considered as pharmakoi, one of Derrida’s ‘undecidables’. See Inter Muros for a full 
discussion of the pharmakon. 
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As the recording of any sound or performance document places it within the first two categories— 
the audio-document and the process and structures of memory—we will approach recording from 
two different angles, starting with the audio-document and its afterlife and how this pertains to the 
archive.  
If, as Derrida asserts, the living being is a only a species of what is dead, and the dead archive is a 
pledge or promise to the future, then there is no difference between the recorded object (the audio-
document), the live performance (that was recorded), and the performances to come that reuse and 
repurpose the earlier audio-document(s). It is all part of a process, all part of the same process. 
Repurposing sound documents is nothing new. From their earliest days, records were more than just 
recordings, their inherent artistic possibilities as found objects having been explored by Cage, Henry, 
Stockhausen, et al, in previous decades. Marclay’s ‘hybridisation’ of genres—for instance, sculpture 
and music (sound) in Record Without a Cover—further problematise the sound document itself as a 
stable medium, in other words, what is the ‘proper’11 use of a record? Does a record have a ‘proper’ 
use in this context? Record Without a Cover deliberately invites damage to the record as object (it is 
literally supplied ‘without a cover’), the physical scarring of the surface as the result of a temporal 
process, creating an evolving soundscape, supplementary to the original recording, over the course 
of time. The record itself is composed of excerpts from other records, so there is a double 
questioning of sound composition: as archive of found sound objects, and as process post recording. 
Suddenly the owner becomes an interactive composer. It would be interesting to hear a 
performance of multiple copies of Record after ten or twenty years of ‘damage.’ Therefore, Record 
forces the listener to question the audio document: the collage of found objects, and the pops, 
hisses and loops caused by its scarification, make it impossible to suspend disbelief and imagine that 
we are listening to a ‘live’ recording. We are listening to a lifetime of ‘record’ experience; we are 
listening to the medium itself.‘ The vinyl record becomes a palimpsest that has a history of layered 
marks that you can’t erase; incidental scratches become a natural part of the piece, not a mistake 
but integral to its meaning and composition.’12 More Encores,13 is another telling example from 
Marclay’s catalogue that brings undecidability to the foreground through ‘the archival implications 
of a medium that purports to capture forever the fleeting elements of a temporally singular musical 
event’ and the ‘impossible’ possibility of repeated ‘live’ performances promised by technologies of 
reproduction.’14   
Derrida sees another ‘undecidable’ contradiction in the very act of recording: 
What is involved in this phonographic act? Here’s an interpretation, one among others. At each 
syllable, even at each silence, a decision is imposed: it was not always deliberate or sometimes even 
the same from one repetition to another. And what it signs is neither law nor the truth…Thus we 
analyse the resource this double text affords us today: on the one hand, a graphic space opened to 
multiple readings, in the traditional and protected form of the book (and it is not like a prompt-book, 
because each time it gives a different reading, another gift, dealing out a new hand all over again), but 
on the other hand, simultaneously, and also for the first time, we have the tape recording of a 
 
11 Is their ‘proper’ use synonymous with their traditional or conventional use? That is, in a conventional form 
of dissemination and nothing more? 
12 Estep, 2014, 39. 
13 More Encores (1988) is a re-mix (re-appropriation) of found sonic objects, including excerpts from records by 
John Cage, Maria Callas, Louis Armstrong and so on. Unusually for Marclay, the excerpts are (in many cases) 
easily identifiable.    
14 González, 2004, 33. 
5 
 
singular interpretation, made one day, by so on and so forth, at a single stroke calculated and by 
chance. (my italics)15  
 
And how do these concerns play out in this thesis?  Take the performance of Cage’s Four⁶ known as 
the ‘LP version’ as an example:16 certainly the solitary, as well as the group, or social, aspect of music 
making (as raised by Marclay), in its performance and its resulting supplements, can be clearly seen 
here; it is by turns a gregarious, solitary, and weirdly hypnotic work to perform in all of its 
manifestations, and the original LPs also embody a certain cultural history of musicmaking, 
individuality, and sociability, as well as the fetishized object of the record itself. The LP version also 
specifically addresses points made by both Marclay and Derrida about the archival sound-document, 
in that the damaged (scratched, painted, written on, beaten, cut, stoned, etc.,) records directly 
result from performing an indeterminate score, which produces three separate supplements: the 
performance itself, the damaged LPs (all of which are playable and reworkable individually), and the 
re-mixed track of composite damaged found objects (LPs), which could then take on yet another life 
of its own and be repurposed again, e.g. spectralized, incorporated into another work,17 and so on. 
Thus the medium of recording is foregrounded, found objects are foregrounded; the score, as 
Derrida says above, is ‘a graphic space open to multiple readings,’ and, here, those readings imply 
multiple physical actions and versions, versions which are radically different from one another as 
well. Yet each performance decision is made in the moment ‘calculated and by chance’; 
undecidability is foregrounded.18 
Let’s return to those scratches on the surface of the record, those scars of experience. Are they part 
of the archive, a record of the passage of time on a single audio-document; or are they the archive 
itself; or both? Derrida notes: 
Again, inscribing inscription, it commemorates in its way, effectively, a circumcision. A very singular 
monument, it is also the document of an archive. In a reiterated manner, it leaves the trace of an 
incision right on the skin: more than one skin at more than one age… Each layer here seems to gape 
slightly, as the lips of a wound, permitting glimpses of the abyssal possibility of another depth 
destined for archaeological excavation.19   
According to Derrida, then, the scratches, whether deliberately or accidentally placed, are another 
document of the archive; in the same way that writing cuts into the surface of the paper or canvas 
can be cut through, we sense the action through the absence left by the cut, its différance. We sense 
the infinite depths of layers that are implied by that cut. And the cut applies to more than just the 
scratches applied (in this case) during the performance; the record (or CD) is also a spiral cut, the 
incision a fundamental part of the recording process—thus a damaged record is a double cut, 
leading to Derrida’s ‘bottomless chessboard on which Being is put into play.’20 Furthermore, archived 
documents and, in particular, audio-documents—in other words the archive itself—speak to us still. 
 
15 Derrida, 2014, 7–8. 
16 Documented in ‘Preamble 1: Bubble, Trumpet, Humming, ‘Fah!’’ In this performance the sound actions were 
applied to LPs (as manuscripts) resulting in five further performance objects—four individual tracks and a final 
mix. 
17 The damaged Nick Drake LP is repurposed in Logosphere. 
18 These same principles can also be applied to the use of radio and time loops, and other live/dead, self-
archiving undecidables. 
19 Derrida, 1998, 20. 
20 Derrida, 1984, 22. 
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The radio in Stockhausen’s Pole, the records in Four⁶, even Metatechnic’s time loops are still, in a 
way, a ‘living’ presence, what Derrida refers to as phantoms: 
Perhaps he does not respond, but he speaks. A phantom speaks….this means that without  
responding it disposes of a response, a bit like the answering machine whose voice outlives its 
moment of recording: you call, the other person is dead, now, whether you know it or not, and the 
voice responds to you…21         
   
We respond to the audio archive by listening, by applauding, by congregating, by using and re-using; 
and, even though in some sense we are talking to feuilles mortes or smelling the residue of burnt 
incense, the archive must, and will, always speak to the future.  
To record, to archive, is the promise of the future, to the future. The promise of the archive ‘…as 
wager [gageure]. The archive has always been a pledge, and like every pledge [gage], a token of the 
future.22                                                           
          
§ 
 
2. Archival structures – structures of memory 
. . . every archive, we will draw some inferences from this, is at once institutive and conservative. 
Revolutionary and traditional. An eco-nomic archive in this double sense: it keeps, it puts in reserve, it 
saves, but in an unnatural fashion, that is to say in making the law (nomos) or making people respect 
the law.23           
  
What better example of the institutive and conservative could there be than the traditional thesis? 
The symbol of the weight of academe, the structures of learning as set out by the institution’s ‘rule 
of law.’ The academy expects that things will be done in a certain way; it expects to be respected as 
its archives grow with the fruits of each generation’s academic labours. But, as Derrida remarks 
above, it also conserves, it preserves, it commits to memory so that we may forget. And archives are 
not infallible, for how often have we said ‘I KNOW I had that link somewhere’; or perhaps, we find 
that the object at the end of the link is no longer there–it has been lost or maybe it has been 
‘disappeared.’24 Archives decay, things become obsolete, the technology that allows us to retrieve 
whatever we are looking for no longer works, no one remembers how to access that memory, i.e. 
the memory of the process of retrieval as well as the object itself. Is the archive doing too much of 
our thinking for us? Is it too ‘unnatural’ to be trusted? Is it too embedded in structures of power? Or 
can it be challenged from within: are there radical hermeneutics at play?  
Here’s what John D. Caputo has to say on the subject, contained within a broader discussion of 
Derrida and the academy:  
Institutions are the way things get done, and they are prone to violence. They are inextricably, 
undecidably, pharmacologically both things at once. Nothing is innocent…One needs to operate 
within the university, to prove oneself according to its standards, in order to expose it to its other, to 
 
21 Derrida, 1998, 62. 
22 Derrida, 1998, 18. 
23 Derrida, 1998, 7. 
24 However, Mark Fisher would argue that the digitalisation of archives means that what we have lost is ‘loss’ 
itself. See Hauntology and Its Supplements for more on this. 
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the abyss, to keep its standards and its preconceived notions of rationality in play, to keep reason in 
play and to keep the play in reason.25        
    
Thus, the archive can indeed be radical, in that it can be used, as though against itself, in order to 
promote the free play of inquiry and knowledge; or, as Derrida says, ‘the archive always works, and 
a priori, against itself.’26 So if we accept the archive, or the archiving archive as Derrida would say, as 
a process of decentring, différance, and play—that is the disruption of binary oppositions, the 
undecidability that Caputo mentions above—then the archive is a place of constant movement, of 
challenge and counter-challenge, of conservation and institution, of double and triple layered 
substrates of memories, of supplements, of networks of relationships formed between their 
contents, which themselves form new networks which can be disseminated, networks which make a 
space for the event… of archiving. As Jabès says: ‘Every word unveils another tie.’27 
This thesis, therefore, is nicely trapped within this oscillation, this process of différance. It is 
composed of texts, sounds, objects, scores, photographs, artworks—of new material from 
(sometimes) old material, with the very purpose of forming a new archive, which becomes old 
material as soon as it is collated but has the possibility of a new life, a disseminated life of 
supplements, outside of this archive. It has no origin (it builds on the work of many other archives) 
and it has no end (there is always more that can be added, more to discover), it is an embodiment of 
the play of the trace. It mixes the cuts of inscription with the cuts of audio-documentation, the 
hypomnesis of a digital presentation that both allows the user to access everything, in any order—
they become users and players (almost composers)—and imposes expectations on the compiler of 
the archive. There are certain presumptions regarding the digital domain, the academy expects that 
everything will be documented, in sound and image and text, that everything will be available 
immediately, in a way, without effort, on the user’s part. And that has implications for the 
presentation and choice of works, and their documentation. Rather than unsatisfactory descriptions, 
language being virtually incapable of doing music justice, having to permanently resort to metaphor, 
the user could just listen and then read the commentary—or the other way around—or entirely omit 
one section or another. Whereas, if a user were in a live performance situation, such as a recital, 
then it would be impossible not to hear: you cannot turn your ears ‘off,’ the vibrations will always 
penetrate the body. To escape the vibrations, you would have to leave. A final thought: as this 
archive is virtual, where does that leave the materiality of objects if we can no longer touch?   
In the digital hypomnesic environment, the user no longer has to sift, to dig, to translate. The user 
merely presses a key—I repeat, in a sense, is the archive now doing our thinking for us, does it 
control our actions as users and compilers? Is the archive in post-industrial society open to being 
used for political means? Here’s Derrida, in conversation with Brunette and Wills, on the subject of  
deconstruction again: ‘I would say that the idea that deconstruction should confine itself to the 
analysis of the discursive text—I know that the idea is widespread—is really either a gross 
misunderstanding or a political strategy (my underlining) designed to limit deconstruction to matters 
of language.’28  So Derrida would certainly assert that the archive (and by extension, the academy) 
should submit itself to deconstruction’s enquiring gaze and should attempt to ‘keep reason in play 
and to keep the play in reason.’29 Can a digital format help rather than hinder this aim? Perhaps, for 
 
25 Caputo, 1987, 235. 
26 Derrida, 1998, 12. 
27 Jabès, 1991, 37. 
28 Brunette & Wills, 1994, 15. 
29 Caputo, 1987, 235. 
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it can throw indeterminacy into the mix, it can allow a (however limited) free choice of pathways 
within the archive, rather than presenting a rigid narrative. It can present links, which can point to 
other areas outside of this archive, and into other archives, always supposing that the user is 
comfortable with following the pre-set paths of whatever search engine is used once the initial links 
are left behind. 
Regarding the museum, it is another example of the archive as institution and the institution as 
archive, for what do museums do but collect, collate, fetishize, order, appropriate, or even steal, and 
sometimes (often?) serve an explicit cultural/political agenda? Marclay seeks to problematise the 
museum’s ontology by deconstructing the exhibition and the exhibition space in a playful, although 
thought-provoking, way. There are other examples of the archive worthy of inclusion here as well, 
though perhaps more controversial. I refer to the 1993 Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art’s 
exhibition on (its curators claimed partly ‘by’) John Cage, Rolywholyover. . . A Circus (1993).30 
Marclay’s Accompagnement Musical (1995), Arranged and Conducted (1997), Keller and Caruso 
(2000) and Shake, Rattle and Roll (fluxmix) (2004) all deal with archives, specifically museum 
collections, as artworks. For Accompagnement, Marclay took objects from assorted museums in 
Geneva, all related to the activity of sound making from around the world: pictures of music-making, 
images related to music applied to any surface, instruments and so on, were (by the standards of the 
museum as institution) haphazardly jumbled together across multiple exhibition spaces, thus forcing 
the viewer into a new perspective of the archival institution in what Marclay described as ‘these 
flea-market-like installations.’31 The regular academic pathway is no longer there, and neither is the 
aspect of sound—it wasn’t an interactive installation, so the instruments on display could not be 
played by the public, a point made doubly clear by a separate collection of empty cases in one of the 
installation’s spaces, memory, or even audio-hallucinations having to supply the missing (traditional) 
‘musical’ sounds.32 
‘I had never thought much about how sound could be experienced through touch, this was 
fascinating.’33 Keller and Caruso takes a similarly sideways glance at the realm of sound and vision (or 
the lack thereof). Utilising the Peabody Conservatory of Music’s Caruso archives, including reportage 
of the meeting between Caruso and Helen Keller in 1917 (where she felt the vibrations of his voice), 
in an installation of sound making and recording objects (record players, discs, records, video), also 
with braille and sign language, Keller and Caruso problematises access to the archival institution and 
access to the experience of sound and vision, through the difficulties of experiencing (and being able 
to ‘interpret’) the whole installation by one person. The impossibility of ever experiencing the whole 
archive. 
You are here. But this place is so vast that even being near means being so distant we can neither see 
nor hear each other.34   
        
Rolywholyover. . . A Circus 
 
30 Cage was involved in the pre-exhibition organisation and collation of exhibits and so on. His death during the 
process meant that the final realisation of the project had to be taken on by the museum though. (Email 
exchange with W F Brooks).      
31 Marclay, 2014, 49. 
32 Ambience becomes the predominant soundscape instead. 
33 Marclay, 2014, 40. 
34 Jabès, 1991, 149. 
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Now for another conundrum. Here’s González describing Marclay’s archival museum installations: 
‘Accompagnement Musical turned the normally staid setting of the traditional period galleries into a 
visual cacophony that more closely resembled a storage space or antique shop than a museum 
display.’35 Contrast the above with Kostelanetz describing the opening night of Rolywholyover: 
‘Because the materials of Rolywholyover were so disparate (and mounted at different heights), the 
rooms resembled a junk shop, in this case with well-scrubbed walls and floors…the impression was 
essentially comic, if not by intention, at least by default,’36 whereas the director’s foreword contains 
the following: ‘Rolywholyover A Circus at The Museum of Contemporary Art is itself a transcending 
composition by Cage, in this case for museum… the works of visual art are moved every day 
according to a chance-generated score. The ‘Circus’ is thus itself a dynamic work of art. As Cage put 
it, “The basic idea is that the exhibition would change so much that if you came back a second time, 
you wouldn’t recognise it.”37  
It would appear that the ‘junk shop,’ ‘storage space,’38 ‘flea-market’ or even ‘composition… for 
museum’ are all things to all people, essentially occupying the same conceptual space, but open to 
very different perceptions—in other words, like Derrida’s ‘space opened to multiple readings.’ If we 
clear away the personal (critical) baggage, dubious claims and so on, surrounding the Cage 
exhibition, we again get an archive in a museum as an independent artwork of some sort. An archive 
in an institution, an archive in an archive that essentially opposes itself in that it replaces the 
museum’s ‘normal’ function with its own radical version, thereby becoming institutionalised in the 
process and subsumed by the archive as it is created. The Cage installation is interesting as, like with 
Marclay, the exhibits were distributed around several galleries39 and their arrangement was 
seemingly haphazard, not only regarding the location of the items (which changed every day 
according to the chance generated score mentioned above), but also regarding what was and what 
was not included40 in their display, labelling and categorisation: in other words, the pathway through 
the archive.41 Thus, rather than (subjectively) viewing Rolywholyover as a missed opportunity to 
celebrate the Cagean aesthetic in a way that, as might be supposed, Cage would have approved of, 
we could reconsider it as an exercise of the archive. An exercise in ‘disrupt[ing] people’s habitual 
ways of processing information,’42 a way of ‘reacting to the whole art system of creating collectable 
objects,’43 about ‘critiquing the institutionalization of the art object, but in a playful and humorous 
way.’44 A group of seemingly disparate objects can be made to resonate simply through their 
proximity to one another. The rest is up to the individual viewer; the path through the archive is a 
personal matter as well as a universal one. And one last thought on the Cage installation: the 
exhibition ‘catalogue’ is a reflective, silver box containing an assortment of items related to Cage and 
his work—bits of prose by Cage and others, interviews, Cage’s drawings, pictures, parts of scores and 
so on—so the archive gave out its own mini-archive as a memento or supplement. And, as 
supplement, the tin box not only replaces, and therefore opposes the museum exhibition, but also, 
 
35 González, 2005, 57. 
36 Kostelanetz, 1996, 164. 
37 Koshalek, 1993, Director’s Foreword, 1st page. 
38 Marclay has also exhibited in unconventional spaces, such as music stores, e.g. Drumkit (1999) and Virtuoso 
(2000)  
39 Four galleries were used at the Museum of Contemporary Art exhibition. 
40 Each room had a theme, such as artworks, objects, etc. 
41 Due to the mobile nature of the location of the objects contained in the exhibition the catalogue very quickly 
became useless as a guide, but interesting as an archive (and artwork), in its own right. 
42 Estep, 2014, 41. 
43 Marclay, 2014, 48. 
44 Marclay, 2014, 49. 
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therefore, opposes itself. There is no guidance about the order in which to read or look at the 
contents (and they soon get disordered). Perhaps like the mirrored tin box that holds them, they 
reflect back on ourselves; perhaps the intention is to give us a little bit of agency when we journey 
through the archive, to try to escape the museum’s fetishization? But there will always be a 
reckoning, eventually, as there is with any journey…   
I give you—a pure gift, without exchange, without return—but whether I want this or not, the gift 
guards itself, keeps itself, and from then on you must owe [tu dois]. […] The gift can only be a 






these shows are not didactic. They don’t inform the viewer about the art object and its historical 
value; it’s more about using the art objects like raw materials in playful ways, and it makes you look at 
the objects differently. 
Christian Marclay, On&By Christian Marclay)46
     
     
The importance to the museum as archival institution, of the fetishization of objects, of histories and 
systems of order and cataloguing, cannot be underestimated. When an artist such as Marclay turns 
these systems of order inside out, attempts to overturn the institutional fetishization of objects by 
placing them, not as part of an academic collection, but by taking the ‘storage room,’ ‘junk shop’ 
approach, the archive works in a different way. As Marclay says, ‘the reason they are together is to 
offer a third reading totally disconnected from their initial usage.’47 Thus the archive works through a 
new set of associations, either by collation (in that they are all related to music in some way, but not 
presented in a standard museum situation); through proximity (they are in several rooms, linked by 
passages which allow a circulation); through location (the music shop;) or through other senses 
(Keller and Caruso problematises sight, sound and touch). And it is to the realm of touch, and the 
materiality and the fetishization of objects, and of ways of overturning this fetishization, of 
overturning the expected (traditional) functions or uses of these objects that we now turn.  
How do these objects relate to or even inhabit the archive? Marclay asserts that it makes you look at 
the objects differently, while Derrida tells us that order is no longer assured.48 Two questions arise 
here: how does the virtual archive (this thesis) accommodate objects when they are no longer 
touchable? How do these questions relate to my own practice? Let’s approach the last question first: 
I am a singer; my ultimate aim is to feel as little as possible vocally (in the throat, that is)—in other 
words, for the singing mechanism to be so smooth, even as all the constituent parts of the vocal 
mechanism are moving, that it becomes almost transcendental. I am denied the tactile realm of 
keys, strings, bows, mallets, and so forth. I am denied the touch of the hands on things. As my 
 
45 Derrida, 2014, 30. 
46 Marclay, 2014, 49. 
47 Marclay, 2014, 85. 
48 Derrida, 1998, 5. 
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instrument is myself, I feel the internal and external mechanisms of my body, muscles, lips, tongue, 
lungs, (a body that gradually accrues all the physical traces of my performances—in a way, the 
archive of my training and profession) but, unless wielding a tuning fork, the hands are usually still 
and empty. Usually, I am denied the materiality of things, but in the creation of this archive, this set 
of performances allows them full reign. Apparently, the hands were bored. 
Every work and its realisation covered explores the tactile realm for me as singer, and the tactile 
aspects of these choices were quite subconscious initially. The choice of works depended on matters 
of performer agency, matters of notation and the performer/composer interface. The (sometimes 
literally) deconstructive possibilities of the hands have only gradually emerged over the process of 
this project. During the five performances of Four⁶, I use my voice only once, instead focusing on the 
musical use of a substantial array of objects, most of which are not musical (including records—more 
on those presently); objects that are now part of a system of bricolage, in that they are put to uses 
outside of their original or expected purpose. Metatechnic does not see or hear me use my voice at 
all, instead engaging the fingers to operate Ableton, as well as working on and in the piano, 
exploring not only the sonorities of the prepared piano, and touching the keyboard as I play, but also 
touching all the elements of preparation (wood, metal, pottery) as I remove them: a process of 
negation which adds to the soundscape. Pole mixes extensive use of the voice with percussion (for 
signalling to the other player); and, then again, the fingers are used to manipulate the effects 
station, that artificially modifies the soundscape. Even Weiβschatten, which Hespos calls a modern 
Lied, and is substantially vocal, allows me the agency to develop any physical theatre I so wish in the 
improvised sections.49  
There are two realms in which these objects operate: the tactile and the material realm—the ways 
in which they are used in performances; and the cultural realm—of histories, of purpose, of value, of 
collectability and prestige, of fetish. Thus, if they can no longer be touched, only heard or seen, does 
that remove their fetish value, and allow them free play in the virtual archive? In the same way that 
the status of the records in the Cage performance is problematised by damage and re-use—who 
wants to collect or buy a damaged record?50—but the records’ original desirability is still there as 
part of their history, the cultural and economic history of these objects has not been erased just 
because they have been re-purposed. They are old and new at the same time, they are undecidable, 
they cause perplexity (aporia), and their move to the virtual archive makes that aporia even greater, 
adds another layer to the substrates. Although the medium is gone, the body of the fetish, if you 
like, the history of that fetish, its différance, remains: 
The trouble de l’archive stems from a mal d’archive…It is to burn with a passion. It is never to rest, 






49 At times this includes lid slamming, as counterpoint to the pianist’s actions. In Hespos’ Shut Ups! (2018, also 
written for me), the singer has several quite elaborate notated lid slamming episodes, as well as freer episodes 
of improvised theatre.  
50 Perhaps more people than we might first imagine… 
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